Blues for the Left Hand: A Critique of Cass Sunstein\u27s  Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech  (reviewing \u3ci\u3eDemocracy and the Problem of Free Speech\u3c/i\u3e by Cass R. Sunstein) by Neuborne, Burt
REVIEWS
Blues for the Left Hand: A Critique of Cass
Sunstein's Democracy and the Problem of
Free Speech
Burt Neubornet
Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech. Cass R. Sunstein.
Free Press, 1993. Pp xx, 300.
Cass Sunstein has written a plea for radical change in the
way we think about the First Amendment.' In place of existing
free speech doctrine, which he accurately characterizes as in-
tensely suspicious of government regulation,2 Professor Sunstein
urges a "New Deal" for free speech under which government
would be authorized to intervene dramatically in aid of weak
speakers and vulnerable hearers. Professor Sunstein's recommen-
t John Norton Pomeroy Professor of Law, New York University Law School. Much of
my perspective on the First Amendment has been shaped by thirty years of close associa-
tion with the American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU"). For eleven of those years, I was
on the ACLU's payroll. I served as National Legal Director of the ACLU during the 1980s
and make no pretense of objectivity.
' I am not sure that Professor Sunstein would agree that his program requires
radical change. In his own words, though, he calls for a "large-scale reassessment of the
appropriate role of the First Amendment in the democratic process" (p xi) and "substan-
tial changes in the theory and practice of free speech" (p xviii). Furthermore, Sunstein
acknowledges that his approach would produce "significant changes in our understanding
of the free speech guarantee" (p xix). And that's only in the Introduction.
2 Professor Sunstein correctly characterizes current doctrine as (1) viewing govern-
ment as particularly dangerous to free speech; (2) treating all speech as equal in the eyes
of the law; (3) including both political and nonpolitical speech; (4) fearing that censorship
is a "slippery slope" that tends to steepen; and (5) rejecting any balancing of competing
interests as too subjective (pp 5-7).
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dations for immediate change are formidable, but nuanced. He
seeks to ban racial epithets, but not hate speech (pp 192-93);
violent pornography, but not erotic speech (pp 214-16). He favors,
at least in theory, a right of access to government information
(pp 105-07), but acknowledges that the government may exercise
a degree of content-based discretion in determining which speech
it will fund (pp 114-18).' He explores limits on individual cam-
paign expenditures (pp 98-100); argues for greater access to the
broadcast media, newspapers, and shopping centers (pp 104-05);
suggests controls on advertisers (pp 85-87); and advocates gov-
ernment efforts to improve the quality of television (pp 82-85).
But he also recognizes the First Amendment rights of corpora-
tions (pp 238-39).
Professor Sunstein's program is the wish list of a person who
values free speech and yearns for a system in which speakers are
worthy of the ideal. But the intellectual construct he wheels out
to justify his agenda has ramifications that far outstrip his
avowed goals. I fear that, in an effort to make things better,
Professor Sunstein's call for a "New Deal" for speech will leave
controversial speech at the mercy of "reformers" a good deal less
benign than Cass Sunstein.
Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech is one in a series
of recent challenges to current First Amendment doctrine by
scholars with a serious commitment to protecting the weak.4
' For example, while he rejects Chief Justice Rehnquist's rationale in Rust v
Sullivan, 500 US 173, 192-200 (1991) (holding that the government may prohibit clinics
that receive federal funding from using that money to provide information to women on
the advisability of abortions), he suggests that the case was rightly decided on its facts
(pp 116-18).
' See, for example, Frederick Schauer, The Political Incidence of the Free Speech
Principle, 64 U Colo L Rev 935 (1993); J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal
Realist Approaches to the First Amendment, 1990 Duke L J 375; Mary E. Becker, The
Politics of Women's Wrongs and the Bill of "Rights": A Bicentennial Perspective, 59 U Chi
L Rev 453, 486-94 (1992); Mary E. Becker, Conservative Free Speech and the Uneasy Case
for Judicial Review, 64 U Colo L Rev 975 (1993); Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic,
Images of the Outsider in American Law and Culture: Can Free Expression Remedy
Systemic Social Ills?, 77 Cornell L Rev 1258 (1992); Morton J. Horwitz, Rights, 23 Harv
CR-CL L Rev 393, 397-98, 402-03 (1988); Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 Tex L
Rev 1363, 1386-92 (1984).
For thoughtful recent responses, see, for example, Steven Shiffrin, The Politics of the
Mass Media and the Free Speech Principle, 69 Ind L J 689 (1994); C. Edwin Baker, Of
Course, More Than Words, 61 U Chi L Rev 1181 (1994), reviewing Catharine A.
MacKinnon, Only Words (Harvard, 1993); Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and the Widening
Gyre of Fund-Raising: Why Campaign Spending Limits May Not Violate the First Amend-
ment After All, 94 Colum L Rev 1281 (1994). See also Burt Neuborne, Ghosts in the Attic:
Idealized Pluralism, Community and Hate Speech, 27 Harv CR-CL L Rev 371 (1992).
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Without claiming any insight into Professor Sunstein's politics or
motives, I want to explore why the winds of censorship seem to
be blowing from the reformist left5 these days and why I fear
that his suggested "New Deal" for speech is likely to do far more
harm than good.
I. SPEECH AND CHANGE: THE RISE OF A NEW FREE SPEECH
PARADIGM
In 1896, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., dissented in Vegelahn v
Guntner,6 a Massachusetts case enjoining peaceful labor picket-
ing. The Vegelahn majority held that peaceful picketing by two
striking workers aimed at persuading other workers to put pres-
sure on an employer was subject to injunctive relief.7 The hold-
ing in Vegelahn accurately reflected the anemic legal protection
afforded to speech and association at the turn of the century. The
First Amendment was, as yet, inapplicable to the states! The
ban on prior restraints was undeveloped.' Substantive speech-
protective doctrines had not yet been forged. Explicit recognition
of freedom of association lay a half-century away.10
' There is an obvious risk involved in throwing words like "left" around in connection
with legal doctrine. I plead guilty in advance to a lack of clarity about the concept. Move-
ment away from the status quo in search of fairer (usually more equal) treatment of
historically subordinated groups, generally through the imposition of new legal obliga-
tions, is my working definition of "left." Adherence to the status quo, either because it is
deemed just, or because change would make things worse, is my working definition of
"right." I do not presume to label Professor Sunstein, although I have found much of his
past work quite helpful in my efforts on behalf of groups lacking political or economic
clout.
In the interest of full disclosure, I should reveal that I have worked with Professor
Sunstein in advancing our shared political goals and that, despite my criticisms of his
book, I look forward to working with him again.
6 167 Mass 92, 44 NE 1077 (1896).
7 Id at 1077-78. A sympathetic reading of Vegelahn discerns a prophylactic effort to
prevent future threats and intimidation by picketers. See Richard A. Epstein, A Common
Law for Labor Relations: A Critique of the New Deal Labor Legislation, 92 Yale L J 1357,
1377-78 (1983). A less sympathetic reading views the opinion as hostile to efforts to use
speech to alter the status quo. Most modern courts, influenced by the First Amendment,
have since rejected the rationale underlying Vegelahn. See, for example, People v Nixon,
248 NY 182, 161 NE 463, 465-66 (1928); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v Florida Gulf Coast
Building and Construction Trades Council, 485 US 568, 578-85 (1988).
6 The Supreme Court first recognized that the First Amendment applied to the
states in Gitlow v New York, 268 US 652, 666 (1925).
' See, for example, Near v Minnesota, 283 US 697, 713-20 (1931) (first recognizing
the strong First Amendment presumption against prior restraints).
'0 See, for example, NAACP v Alabama, 357 US 449, 460-66 (1958) (holding that
state action indirectly curtailing the freedom of association is subject to strict scrutiny).
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Much of the reformist left's legal agenda during the twenti-
eth century has centered on removing doctrinal obstacles to ro-
bust free speech like the roadblocks in Vegelahn. Enhancing the
power of the politically or socially powerless (or their intellectual
surrogates) to speak and associate in an effort to change the
status quo became an egalitarian article of faith.11
Most of the twentieth century was, after all, a time of re-
markable intellectual self-confidence on the left. Powerful egali-
tarian theories, and faith in them, abounded. Fueled by confi-
dence in the persuasive power of their ideas and anger at the
manifestly unfair nature of much of American life, left-leaning
reformers perceived a symbiotic relationship between free speech
and egalitarian change. They believed that robust freedom of
speech and association would necessarily persuade the mass of
unfairly treated citizens to exert moral, political, and economic
power in the service of reform. In short, the left confidently be-
lieved that time, truth, and free speech were on its side.
" I will not attempt to document the reformist left's support of free speech during
most of the twentieth century. My knowledge of this phenomenon stems primarily from
my experience defending free speech cases for the ACLU. I knew who my natural allies
were. More importantly, although it is academic hearsay, during my early years with the
ACLU, I was privileged to work with people like Roger Baldwin, Osmond Fraenkel, Helen
Buttenweiser, and Marvin Karpatkin, who regaled me with stories of the early years of
the free speech movement. My understanding of the relationship between the left and free
speech derives from their teaching.
The left's support for expansive free speech theory contained more than a dollop of
self-interest: until very recently, censorship in the United States has been dispro-
portionately aimed at left-wing speakers. See generally Samuel Walker, Hate Speech: The
History of an American Controversy (Nebraska, 1994). Whether the censorship involved
labor organizations, women's suffrage, opposition to the First World War, support for vari-
ous forms of Marxism or anarchist theory, the McCarthy years, the civil rights move-
ments, or opposition to the war in Vietnam, the left bore the brunt of most efforts to
censor. See, for example, Debs v United States, 249 US 211 (1919) (opponents of World
War I); Dennis v United States, 341 US 494 (1951) (communists and anarchists);
Barenblatt v United States, 360 US 109 (1959) (McCarthy-era communists); Shuttlesworth
v City of Birmingham, 394 US 147 (1969) (civil rights activists); NAACP v Clairborne
Hardware Co., 458 US 886 (1982) (same); United States v O'Brien, 391 US 367 (1968)
(opponents of Vietnam War).
Of course, there have been significant episodes when the right bore the burden of
censorship, such as the Nazis marching in Skokie, see generally Lee C. Bollinger, The
Skokie Legacy: Reflections on an "Easy Case" and Free Speech Theory, 80 Mich L Rev 617
(1982), and the Ku Klux Klan in Brandenburg v Ohio, 395 US 444 (1969). I am not
certain how to categorize the efforts to censor the Jehovah's Witnesses during the late
1930s and early 1940s. See, for example, Cantwell v Connecticut, 310 US 296 (1940).
I do not claim, therefore, that there was a conscious effort to treat the left worse
than the right; merely that leftist speech seeking change was more prevalent and more
feared.
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Similarly, through much of the twentieth century, defenders
of the status quo-whether political, economic, social, sexual, or
religious-feared that expansive free speech would inevitably
lead to change. The apostles of order warned that uncontrolled
free speech and association would unleash profoundly
destabilizing influences with unpredictable consequences for
American society. 2 The corrosive potential of unconstrained free
speech and association became a bogeyman, triggering censorship
efforts whenever order seemed threatened by speech-induced
change.
Not surprisingly given such a dynamic, during the formative
period of First Amendment jurisprudence,"3 the paradigmatic
free speech case pitted speakers seeking to alter the status quo
against censors bent on preserving it. Since speech as an agent of
change appeared to be the principal beneficiary of the First
Amendment, and since change was the byword of the left, vigor-
ous protection of freedom of speech and association fit comfort-
ably into the left's agenda for much of the century.
In recent years, for at least three reasons, the left's percep-
tion of a comfortable fit between expansive free speech theory
and change has eroded. First, and most important, the left's very
success in ameliorating many gross injustices has weakened the
structural relationship between expansive free speech, democra-
cy, and further change. During the years from Roosevelt to Rea-
gan, under prodding from the left, virtually all formal barriers to
equal participation in politics and economics were swept away:
equality became enshrined as a national ideal, gender roles un-
derwent revolutionary change, and repressive attitudes toward
sexuality diminished. During the same period, the nation
achieved global dominance, produced immense wealth, and devel-
oped tolerably fair methods of distributing it. As a re-
sult-perhaps for the first time in human history-a combination
of formal legal equality, economic opportunity, and tolerable
12 See, for example, Frohwerk v United States, 249 US 204 (1919); Debs, 249 US at
212-15.
" The first case openly using the First Amendment to set aside a state criminal con-
viction was Stromberg v California, 283 US 359, 368-70 (1931), reversing a conviction for
publicly displaying a red flag. Stromberg opened the modern free speech era. Although
Fiske v Kansas, 274 US 380, 386-87 (1927), had earlier reversed a conviction on what we
would today recognize as First Amendment grounds, the Court relied solely on substan-
tive due process. The cycle of expansive free speech jurisprudence that opened with
Stromberg culminated in Texas v Johnson, 491 US 397 (1989), and United States v
Eichman, 496 US 310 (1990), reversing state and federal convictions for burning Ameri-
can flags.
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distributional equity have combined to create a society where
genuine deference to the wishes of the majority, expressed
through robust free speech and democratic choice, will not neces-
sarily tend toward change. The left has discovered, to its dismay,
that the greater the success in ameliorating gross injustice, the
less likely it becomes that free speech and democracy will inevi-
tably lead to new cycles of change.
When wealth and power are concentrated in a small segment
of the population, the natural consequence of providing an op-
pressed majority with robust rights of speech, association, and
democratic choice is the unleashing of a powerful force for
change. But once the cycle of change has progressed to the point
where wealth and power are widely dispersed among the bulk of
the population, the consequence of continuing to respect robust
free speech and democratic choice may well be the self-interested
rejection by a complacent or frightened majority of calls for fur-
ther change. Thus, in systems where formal legal and economic
inequality persists or where blatantly unfair economic or social
inequality produces widespread discontent, expansive rights of
free speech and association will generally lead the mass of un-
fairly treated people to demand change. That is precisely what
happened in the United States throughout much of this centu-
ry-and may well happen again in the next if the economic condi-
tion of the bulk of Americans continues to erode.
But in systems like ours that have achieved formal legal
equality and a tolerable level of economic well-being for much of
the population, expansive free speech no longer necessarily corre-
lates with change; to the contrary, it may correlate with resis-
tance to change. In such settings, genuine free speech may well
aid the relatively affluent majority in opposing reforms designed
to benefit the unfortunate minority that has been left behind. 4
I believe that frustration with such structural resistance to
change has tempted some left-leaning reformers to consider cen-
sorship (often cloaked in a republican theory about seeking the
14 A melancholy comparison between the debate over Social Security and health care
reform illustrates the point. During the 1930s, widespread anxiety over economic insecuri-
ty in old age led to an overwhelming political consensus about the need for a national
Social Security system. In the 1990s, with much of the population enjoying adequate
health insurance, it has proven impossible to marshal a political consensus for additional
change designed to assist the 15 percent of the population lacking adequate coverage.
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common good") as a means of combatting rational, speech-driv-
en attitudes that hinder the left's vision of progress.
The second reason that robust free speech is currently
viewed by some reformers as inimical to change is that they
currently lack an affirmative political program of their own. For
most of the century, the moral power of the egalitarian ideal
produced a stream of passionate speech aimed at persuading
society to eliminate public and private barriers to equal partici-
pation in all aspects of the nation's life. From the assault on
slavery, to the battle for racial justice, to the women's movement,
to the modern struggle for gay liberation, left-leaning reformers
were never at a loss for the magnificent words and heroic symbol-
ism that propelled American society to grant full, formal equality
to blacks, women, and the other "discrete and insular minorities"
suffering from legally reinforced biases."
Once the left had largely achieved formal legal equality by
the 1970s, it turned its attention toward closing the gap between
the promise of equality and the reality of widespread injustice.
Traditionally, the left's principal tool in that effort has been the
state. From Marxist ideas of control of production and distribu-
tion, to the reforms of the New Deal, to the mildly
redistributionist policies of the Kennedys, left-leaning reformers
had placed their faith in government as the principal engine for
achieving real justice. But the collapse of the Marxist dream and
the post-Vietnam, post-Watergate loss of faith in government
deprived many left-leaning reformers of the linchpin of their
programs. Embittered by the continuing gap between formal
equality and real-world injustice, but lacking a coherent prescrip-
15 For a discussion of this phenomenon, see generally Martin H. Redish and Gary
Lippman, Freedom of Expression and the Civic Republican Revival in Constitutional
Theory: The Ominous Implications, 79 Cal L Rev 267 (1991); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., What
Is Republicanism, and Is It Worth Reviving?, 102 Harv L Rev 1695 (1989). For thoughtful
examples of the genre, see generally Frank Michelman, Saving Old Glory: On Constitu-
tional Iconography, 42 Stan L Rev 1337 (1990); Frank Michelman, Conceptions of Democ-
racy in American Constitutional Argument: The Case of Pornography Regulation, 56 Tenn
L Rev 291 (1989); Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy and the First Amendment, 32
Wm & Mary L Rev 267 (1991); Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment,
1986 Duke L J 589; Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 Yale L J 1539
(1988).
I have argued that state judges, using the common law and state constitutions, can
play a critical role in helping us to break out of the political stymie generated by our
success in creating a society where the majority can no longer be counted on to support
efforts to help the weak. Burt Neuborne, State Constitutions and the Evolution of Positive
Rights, 20 Rutgers L J 881 (1989).
"6 See David A.J. Richards, Public Reason and Abolitionist Dissent, 69 Chi Kent L
Rev 787 (1994).
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tion for closing that gap, many reformers have found themselves
literally speechless. Lacking an affirmative political program of
their own, some reformers have been experimenting with republi-
can censorship as a political program of last resort, just as the
right had turned to authoritarian censorship during similar peri-
ods of self-doubt.'7
Yet a third reason that some now see expansive freedom of
speech as inconsistent with social reform is that, beginning in the
1970s, the universe of constitutionally protected speech expanded
dramatically to include new categories that powerfully reinforce
the status quo. The Supreme Court's acknowledgement of the
First Amendment rights of corporate is and commercial 9 speak-
ers introduced two sets of newly protected voices that were-and
remain--distinctly uncongenial to many on the left. Moreover,
the Court's refusal in Buckley v Valeo2" to permit limits on cam-
paign expenditures by the wealthy raised serious concerns of
political fairness.
Of course, powerful speech supporting the status quo is not
new. Reformers have long complained that the marketplace of
ideas is rigged against fundamental change. Wealthy voices like
Henry Ford's have long inveighed against change;s' well-heeled
campaign contributors have always expected the political system
" During the 1950s, the right suffered a crisis of confidence. A worldwide tide ap-
peared to be sweeping collectivist economic philosophies to victory over an outdated indi-
vidualist idea. The result was the pathology of the McCarthy era. For histories of the Mc-
Carthy period, see Robert Griffith, The Politics of Fear: Joseph R. McCarthy and the Sen-
ate (Kentucky, 1970); Fred J. Cook, The Nightmare Decade: The Life and Times of Senator
Joe McCarthy (Random House, 1971). For a survey of the legal issues raised by efforts to
suppress communism in the United States, see Norman Dorsen, Paul Bender, and Burt
Neuborne, 1 Emerson, Haber, and Dorsen's Political and Civil Rights in the United States
46-201 (Little, Brown, 4th ed 1976).
" First Natl Bank of Boston v Bellotti, 435 US 765 (1978) (holding that in the ab-
sence of a compelling state interest, a statute criminalizing corporate speech about a
referendum violated the First Amendment). But see Austin v Michigan State Chamber of
Commerce, 494 US 652, 657-66 (1990) (upholding restrictions on campaign expenditures
by corporations).
" Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
US 748, 761-73 (1976) (invalidating ban on price advertising of prescription drugs).
2 424 US 1, 12-59 (1976) (striking down expenditure limits in federal campaigns).
21 Throughout the 1920s, Henry Ford published a personal newspaper, The Dearborn
Independent, that reached over 600,000 readers and preached a steady diet of right-wing
propaganda, featuring strong doses of anti-Semitism. Ford dealers were required to
distribute the Independent. One of the ACLU's earliest defenses of free speech involved
efforts to shield The Dearborn Independent from censorship in New York, Cleveland,
Toledo, and Columbus, Ohio. See generally Samuel Walker, Hate Speech: The History of
an American Controversy 19-21 (Nebraska, 1994); Samuel Walker, In Defense of American
Liberties: A History of the American Civil Liberties Union 51-71 (Oxford, 1990).
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to contain change; and one of the most powerful mass organiza-
tions in the nation's history, the Ku Klux Klan, existed to pre-
vent change.22 To some, however, the power of today's speech to
impede change seems greater than ever. Perhaps it is the current
lack of a widely accepted program for change: speech reinforcing
the status quo sounds louder in a vacuum. Perhaps we have
achieved a heightened understanding of the extent to which de-
meaning speech about women, blacks, Latinos, and gays rein-
forces an unjust status quoY Perhaps it is the spectacle of poli-
ticians in every democratic country literally selling themselves to
special interests.24 Perhaps it is the elitist tendency to assume
that a failure to accept high-minded advice must be based on a
communication breakdown, not a rejection on the merits. Perhaps
it is the undeniable coarsening of our mass culture. Perhaps it
really is the emergence of new categories of protected speakers
with a clear stake in maintaining the status quo. Whatever the
causes, many thoughtful reformers now perceive expansive free
speech as an obstacle to change, rather than its symbiotic agent.
The result has been the emergence of a new free speech
paradigm. Instead of reformist speakers bent on change confront-
ing censors bent on order, the new paradigm pits speech that
perpetuates the status quo against a censor bent on reform.'
Today, whether it involves efforts to ban hate speech26 or pornog-
See generally David M. Chalmers, Hooded Americanism: The History of the Ku
Ilux Klan (Quadrangle, 1968).
" See, for example, Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering
the Victim's Story, 87 Mich L Rev 2320, 2331-41 (1989); Charles R. Lawrence III, If He
Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 Duke L J 431, 457-66;
Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and
Name-Calling, 17 Harv CR-CL L Rev 133, 135-49 (1982).
For calls to censor pornography as a form of hate speech directed at women, see
Andrea Dworkin, Pornography: Men Possessing Women (Women's, 1981); MacKinnon,
Only Words 22-23 (cited in note 4).
My reluctance to censor racist and sexist speech coexists with respect for the schol-
ars who have enhanced our understanding of the pain inflicted by such speech and of our
duty to respond to it with vigorous condemnation and support for its targets.
' A vast literature has grown up around the problem of campaign financing. For
thoughtful discussions of the area, see Blasi, 94 Colum L Rev 1281 (cited in note 4); David
A. Strauss, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance Reform, 94 Colum L Rev 1369
(1994); Lillian R. BeVier, Money and Politics: A Perspective on the First Amendment and
Campaign Finance Reform, 73 Cal L Rev 1045 (1985).
' Professor Sunstein notes the emergence of a new paradigm, but characterizes it
very differently. To him, the change is from political speakers offering dissenting visions
to trivial speakers offering sensationalism and materialism (pp 2-3).
26 Compare R.AV. v City of St. Paul, 112 S Ct 2538 (1992) (striking down a munici-
pal hate speech ordinance), with Wisconsin v Mitchell, 113 S Ct 2194 (1993) (upholding
enhanced sentences for criminal defendants whose crimes were racially motivated).
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raphy,27 attempts to turn down the volume of powerful speakers
in the context of political campaigns,' or efforts to censor com-
mercial speech,29 the dominant pressure for regulating speech
now comes from reformers seeking to alter an unacceptable sta-
tus quo.
II. CAN THE NEW FREE SPEECH PARADIGM SUCCEED?
Most early efforts at reformist censorship have been either
clumsy exercises of raw power wrapped in a veneer of good inten-
tions'0 or cries of rage that fail to pose substantive challenges to
existing doctrine."' It was only a matter of time, however, until
thoughtful reformers attempted a serious defense of the new
paradigm in an effort to reforge the lost link between speech and
change. Cass Sunstein's Democracy and the Problem of Free
Speech is such an attempt. Since Professor Sunstein clearly val-
ues free speech, this book is an important test of whether exist-
ing doctrine can be modified to support egalitarian ideals without
doing real damage to the idea of free speech. In short, if someone
as smart and as decent as Cass Sunstein can't pull this off, it
probably can't be done.
As a thoughtful indictment of the ways our current system of
free speech falls short of an ideal one, Sunstein's book is a wel-
come reminder of the need for reform, especially in areas where
speech and money combine to create an unhealthy sludge of
information and power. But as a blueprint for radical change in
' MacKinnon, Only Words at 22-23 (cited in note 4); Sunstein, 1986 Duke L J at 608
(cited in note 15). See also American Booksellers Ass'n v Hudnut, 771 F2d 323, 327-34 (7th
Cir 1985), aff'd, 475 US 1001 (1986) (striking down a city ordinance that created civil lia-
bility for harms caused by pornography).
2 See, for example, Ronald K.L. Collins and David M. Skover, The First Amendment
in an Age of Paratroopers, 68 Tex L Rev 1087, 1108-09, 1114-15 (1990); Balkin, 1990 Duke
L J at 378, 413-14 (cited in note 4); J. Skelly Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics:
Is the First Amendment an Obstacle to Political Equality?, 82 Colum L Rev 609, 642-45
(1982).
' C. Edwin Baker, Commercial Speech. A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 Iowa
L Rev 1 (1976).
"' See, for example, Doe v University of Michigan, 721 F Supp 852 (E D Mich 1989)
(holding that a university policy on discrimination and harassment was unconstitutionally
vague and overbroad); UWM Post, Inc. v Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin
System, 774 F Supp 1163 (E D Wis 1991) (holding that a university policy that prohibited
racial epithets violated the First Amendment); RA.V. v City of St. Paul, 112 S Ct 2538
(1992); American Booksellers Ass'n v Hudnut, 771 F2d 323 (7th Cir 1985), aff'd, 475 US
1001 (1986).
31 MacKinnon, Only Words (cited in note 4); Dworkin, Pornography (cited in note 23).
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First Amendment theory, I find Professor Sunstein's thesis un-
workable, unnecessary, and dangerous.
Professor Sunstein draws a bleak picture of a contemporary
speech process dominated by the wealthy and powerful, pander-
ing to mass taste, excluding the unorthodox, and failing to pro-
vide the necessary raw material for meaningful democratic de-
bate." Others might paint a much brighter picture of a massive
information bazaar on the verge of enormous technological devel-
opment, with the power of an idea ultimately dependent on its
persuasive power in the intellectual marketplace." The truth
probably lies somewhere in between. But even if he overstates
the flaws in contemporary communications practice, Professor
Sunstein is clearly right in observing that our speech process is
far from ideal. It is his prescription for reform that scares me.
Professor Sunstein argues that the current "free market"
approach to free speech in the United States profoundly disserves
his ideal of "democratic deliberation" (p xviii). In some settings,
he argues, current laissez-faire First Amendment doctrine pro-
tects too much speech, permitting powerful private speakers to
dominate the speech marketplace unfairly' and allowing
hatemongers and violent pornographers to poison the air (pp
xviii, 209-11). In others, he argues that orthodox First Amend-
ment doctrine protects too little speech, permitting powerful
private forces to freeze out unorthodox or weak voices (pp 93-98)
and the government to conceal needed information from the pub-
lic (pp 105-07). Professor Sunstein contends that the Supreme
Court treats the speech status quo as a natural baseline, a ten-
dency that he likens to the Supreme Court's treatment in
Lochner v New York 5 of the economic status quo as a
prepolitical, natural baseline.36
Professor Sunstein argues that, far from being either natural
or prepolitical, the current free speech status quo is an artificial
' See, for example, his description of the state of broadcast television (p 58).
Sunstein argues that television news sensationalizes or ignores important stories (p 59),
that advertisers influence the content of programming (pp 62-66), that children's shows
are too violent (p 66), and that programming is often gender biased (p 67).
' The difference in perspective can be attributed in part to Professor Sunstein's
insistence that the mere availablity of high-quality or provocative speech is not enough.
The speech must be heard and considered by large numbers of people, whether or not
they want to hear and consider it, in order for him to be satisfied (pp 18-23, 67-75).
See pp 62-66 (excessive influence of advertising money on broadcast media) and pp
93-101 (inequities resulting from asymmetries in campaign funding).
" 198 US 45 (1905).
' Professor Sunstein's baseline theory is set forth at pp 28-51.
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baseline derived from two social constructs: (1) the legal rules
defining and protecting private property; 7 and (2) a complex set
of social and legal rules setting the parameters within which
individual preferences and personalities are shaped.' Since
there is nothing sacred or inevitable about the current content of
either set of constructs, Sunstein believes that when the shape of
either construct disserves paramount free speech values (which
he derives from his interpretation of Madisonian democracy),
government can and should intervene to alter the speech market
(p 35). After all, he argues, the great lesson of the New Deal was
that it approved the majority's power to intervene to alter artifi-
cial property baselines (pp 28-33). A parallel willingness to evalu-
ate artificial free speech baselines generated by similarly artifi-
cial legal and social constructs is needed, Professor Sunstein
says, as a second New Deal, this time for speech (pp 34-38).
Conscious of the risks involved in any legal theory that
treats the existing distribution of speech assets and speech pref-
erences as contingent artifacts subject to rearrangement by the
state, Professor Sunstein seeks to place limits on the political
majority's power to reconstruct the free speech baseline. The
"natural" free speech baseline is to be found, according to
Sunstein, not in the accident of today's free speech status quo,
s7 The argument is made throughout the book. See, for example, pp 39-40.
s See, for example, pp 73-74, and the discussion of autonomy at pp 137-39.
Professor Sunstein's articulation of the second set of constructs, what I call the in-
dividual baseline, is not as explicit as his depiction of the property baseline. I believe,
nevertheless, that the point is demonstrably present in his skepticism about autonomy,
his willingness to override preferences, and his acceptance of the need to protect members
of racial minorities and women against ugly images of themselves. Indeed, without the
individual baseline, the chapters on hate speech and pornography cannot be integrated
into Professor Sunstein's "New Deal" thesis. For examples of Professor Sunstein's treat-
ment of preferences and world view as a construct of the law, see p 19:
In this system of "government by discussion," private preferences and beliefs are not
taken as fixed and static. What people now prefer and believe may be a product of
insufficient information, limited opportunities, legal constraints, or unjust back-
ground conditions.
Professor Sunstein sees information as a public good, and therefore a suitable candi-
date for government regulation when the market breaks down (pp 68-71). Finally, Profes-
sor Sunstein does not see such government readjustment as violative of individual autono-
my:
Indeed, preferences and beliefs themselves tend to adapt to existing opportunities,
and we might well conclude that someone has been deprived of autonomy if her pref-
erences and beliefs have been shaped by oppressive or unjust background conditions
(p 137).
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but in a "Madisonian" reading of the speech clause of the First
Amendment.39
According to Sunstein on Madison, the First Amendment's
dominant purpose is the protection of political speech that is
needed for the proper functioning of a polity of political equals
seeking the common good-what Sunstein calls a "deliberative
democracy" (pp 18-19). Although Sunstein acknowledges autono-
my interests such as self-expression and the advancement of
individual goals as subordinate First Amendment values, he sees
the advancement of deliberative democracy as the overarching
value in the Madisonian framework (p xx). According to Sunstein,
legal rules and audience preferences that serve deliberative de-
mocracy must be carefully protected, but-very much in the tra-
dition of Robert Bork4 -legal rules and audience preferences
that disserve Professor Sunstein's vision of deliberative democra-
cy may be fair game for reconfiguration by the majority.
Under Professor Sunstein's proposed "New Deal," political
speech-narrowly defined as "speech both intended and received"
as comment on current issues of public concern (p 130)-is enti-
tled to significant protection similar in most ways to current law,
except that even political speech could be subject to some reg-
ulation in pursuit of a better quality of deliberation by more
nearly equal players.4' Speech falling outside this definition
would receive less protection, roughly equivalent to the protection
currently enjoyed by commercial speech (p 123), under an ill-
defined analytic structure bearing a disturbing resemblance to
the pre-Holmes "harmful tendency" test.42 The current ban on
viewpoint-based censorship of both political and nonpolitical
speech survives as the principal protection against government
manipulation (pp 155-58, 173), although Sunstein would support
even viewpoint-based speech controls in nonpolitical settings
See, for example, pp xvi-xvii, 18-23, 121-37, 241-52.
o See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47
Ind L J 1, 20-35 (1971). In fairness to Professor Sunstein, unlike Judge Bork's 1971
model, the Sunstein model purports to provide significant protection for nonpolitical
speech. I have real doubts, however, that the analytical structure designed to protect
nonpolitical speech, which is barely fleshed out in the book (see pp 148-50, 154-58) would
turn out to be very effective. As with Judge Bork's 1971 analysis, Professor Sunstein's
insistence that the First Amendment has a dominant, instrumental value associated with
the proper functioning of democracy leaves speech falling outside the instrumental pale
highly vulnerable to censorship.
41 Professor Sunstein would, at a minimum, consider the regulation of political speech
in the context of campaign expenditure limitations (pp 98-101) and suppression of racial
epithets (pp 153-54, 163).
42 See Shaffer v United States, 255 F 886 (9th Cir 1919).
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when so-called low-value speech is reasonably believed to harm
the weak by reinforcing their unequal status (pp 174-77, 192-93).
Under Professor Sunstein's system, certain racial epithets
may be banned because they reinforce inequality without aiding
political discussion (pp 163, 190-93); violent pornography may be
prohibited because it harms women (pp 163, 224-26); newspapers
may be forced to print replies in order to foster a better-informed
public (pp 107-08); the mass media may be taxed to discourage
reliance on advertising (pp 86-87); broadcasters may be regulated
to assure "quality" programming and may be forced to air unpop-
ular programs designed to improve the quality of public delibera-
tion (pp 81-92); and individuals may be forbidden, in the name of
equality, to expend too much money in support of a candidate or
an issue (pp 100-01).
Justifying each exercise of so-called Madisonian speech man-
agement is Professor Sunstein's reminder that the current speech
status quo rests on two artificial props: the legal construction of
private property and the social construction of individual prefer-
ences. Under Sunstein's thinking, newspapers should not com-
plain when the government tells them to print something that
helps democracy: after all, it is the government's creation and en-
forcement of laws protecting private property that enables the
newspaper to exclude unwanted material in the first place (p 50).
Broadcasters shouldn't complain when the government regulates
program content in aid of quality and diversity: the broadcast
franchise is, after all, a gift from the state (pp 36-37, 44-46, 50).
Rich folks shouldn't complain when they are prevented from
expending personal resources on speech: the very existence of
their personal wealth is traceable to prior government judgments
(pp 36-37, 97-98). Listeners shouldn't complain when their prefer-
ences are overridden by a paternalistic state: those preferences
are merely a reflection of a reality shaped, in part, by tolerated
speech (pp 73-74).
I have three strategic criticisms of Professor Sunstein's the-
sis. First, and most important, it creates an unacceptable risk of
widespread censorship. In an effort to limit the risks to free
speech inherent in his system, Professor Sunstein attempts a
series of fine distinctions designed to differentiate protected
speech from speech subject to regulation. He attempts these
distinctions, I believe, because he genuinely values free speech
and hopes to limit censorship to a relatively small arena. But his
distinctions cannot hold. In fact, when Sunstein's notion of con-
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tingent baselines is combined with the vulnerability of his dis-
tinctions, a blueprint for widespread censorship is apparent.
For example, Professor Sunstein promises to insulate "politi-
cal" speech from undue government control (pp 135-37). But only
Cass Sunstein knows what "political" speech is. Who knows
where politics end and nonpolitics begin? Professor Sunstein
confidently asserts that Robert Mapplethorpe's work is "political"
(pp 153, 162). With equal confidence, however, he asserts that
Gypsy Rose Lee's is not (pp 152-54, 164-65). Apart, however, from
the quality of beverages consumed by the respective audiences for
Mapplethorpe and burlesque, is there a principled reason to label
one "political" and the other "nonpolitical" as a matter of law?
In fact, a principled line cannot be drawn between "politics"
and the rest of the culture. Professor Sunstein's partial embrace
of Robert Bork's thesis that a democracy can function as long as
political speech is protected overlooks the fact that politics de-
pends upon a world view that is shaped by science, art, and pop-
ular culture. I do not believe that Professor Sunstein would deny
the importance of these influences. Indeed, he claims to extol
them, to the point of recognizing Ulysses and Bleak House as
"political speech" (p 152-53). If, however, some literature, art, and
music is "political," then what is nonpolitical? Take the case of
"gangsta rap." To many, the genre is a violent, misogynistic exer-
cise in triviality. I firmly believe that it projects a destructive
vision of life. To a child growing up in a ghetto, though, its thor-
oughly disconcerting subject matter-indeed, its very capacity to
drive people like me up the wall-may be the most effective way
to express pain and outrage. The fact is that in order to separate
Robert Mapplethorpe from Gypsy Rose Lee, and gangsta rap from
Joan Baez, we need a baseline. Why should it be Cass Sunstein's
postpolitical, postcultural baseline? Why not Louis Farrakhan's?
Why not Jesse Helms's? Either Sunstein's model includes almost
everything within an elastic conception of political speech, in
which case his model is pretty much a fraud, or it excludes a
significant body of speech pursuant to an arbitrary and culturally
driven definition of what counts as political. Either way, the
model fails.
As the difficulty in differentiating political from nonpolitical
speech illustrates, many of Professor Sunstein's distinctions lack
a principled basis, other than Cass Sunstein's own view of what
should or should not be censored. For example, in defending a
plan to censor violent pornography, Professor Sunstein makes the
case for regulating pictures that eroticize violence because of the
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harm the pictures are said to cause (pp 212-25). He assures us
that no criminal sanctions will be involved-merely a civil dam-
age remedy for individuals who can actually "prove" actual injury
(pp 213-14, 217). Yet once he allows civil sanctions, there is no
principle that would prevent the imposition of criminal sanctions.
Moreover, Professor Sunstein's suggestion that injunctive relief
would be available to prevent "continuing harm" caused by vio-
lent pornography would almost certainly lead to injunctions de-
signed to prevent the harm from occurring in the first place.
What principle could distinguish the two?
Similarly, Sunstein assures us that his pornography restric-
tions would cover material that is already unprotected under
Miller v California,' with only a slight extension (p 226). But
the relaxed standard of harm underlying his scheme makes no
principled distinction between violent pornography and other
forms of sexually explicit speech that eroticize female subordina-
tion.
Sunstein even promises to apply his new standards only to
pornographic pictures, and not words (pp 154, 218). Apart from
the obvious class bias in distinguishing pictures from words,
however, how can an enduring line be drawn at pictures, but not
explicit written descriptions of the same scene?
He promises that he would ban only racial epithets and cross
burning, but not hate speech generally (p 192). But the principle
that racial epithets, or cross burnings, cause sufficient harm to be
banned cannot be stopped at either. In fact, the main difference
between a racial epithet and other forms of noxious hate speech
is likely to be the social class of the speaker.
Although Professor Sunstein makes an effort to assure some
protection for speech falling into the nonpolitical darkness, his
assurances are hardly reassuring. Sunstein's suggestion that the
level of protection currently available to commercial speech would
provide effective protection for all nonpolitical speech is frighten-
ing.4 Current commercial speech doctrine permits the state to
' 413 US 15 (1973) (defining obscenity and denying First Amendment protection to
obscene material).
" Professor Sunstein cites the relaxed standards governing commercial speech as a
model for the regulation of much of what he characterizes as "low-value" speech. But what
he perceives as an anomaly pointing the way to general relaxation of First Amendment
standards is really a sophisticated measure of the relative interests of speakers and
hearers in a commercial context. The dignitary interest in self-expression that supports
the speaker's interest in many noncommercial contexts is simply not present when a
corporation hawks its wares. Rather, the listener's instrumental interest in receiving
information needed to make informed and autonomous choices is the dominant value in
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define what is true and what is misleading." It permits the
state to ban speech proposing unlawful activity.46 It even per-
mits the state to ban truthful speech about socially undesirable,
but lawful, behavior."
Because there is no discernible principle underlying
Sunstein's distinction between violent political and nonpolitical
speech, between pornography and sexually explicit speech, or
between hate speech that is subject to regulation and hate speech
that is protected; and because the level of protection available to
nonpolitical speech under his system is so weak, it is impossible
to control the scope of censorship.
This lack of a principled limit to the scope of censorship
leads, in turn, to my second strategic criticism of Sunstein's agen-
da. There is no reason to believe that the powerful private forces
that Sunstein claims now systematically distort the laissez-faire
speech market will not also control government decisions about
who gets to say what.
Although Sunstein asserts that government is unlikely to
have perverse incentives to censor art or science, his assurance is
belied by history-Galileo or James Joyce. Governments have
always understood that art is deeply political because it shapes
the way we see the world. The Nazis knew exactly what they
were doing when they censored modern art as "degenerate": mo-
dernity projected a contingent, nuanced view of the world that
was diametrically opposed to the absolutes of National Socialism.
Thus, although Professor Sunstein vests the government with
powerful discretionary tools to regulate speech, he cannot assure
that those tools would be any less subject to the harmful influ-
ences that he claims currently distort the laissez-faire speech
market.4
8
play. Not surprisingly, commercial speech has developed as a listener-centered doctrine.
" Friedman v Rogers, 440 US 1, 9-10 (1979) (false and misleading commercial speech
may be banned).
46 Pittsburgh Press Co. v Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 US 376, 388-
89 (1973) (upholding city ordinance prohibiting employment advertising that designated
job preferences by gender); United States v Edge Broadcasting Co., 113 S Ct 2696 (1993)
(upholding a federal statute that prohibited the broadcast of lottery advertising in states
that ban gambling).
'7 Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 US 328, 340-
47 (1986) (government may ban advertising for lawful casino gambling aimed at residents
of Puerto Rico).
As the rocky history of the National Endowment for the Arts illustrates, when gov-
ernment chooses to fund art, the inevitable judgments about quality, eligibility for sub-
sidy, and allocation of limited funds will almost certainly trigger political discussion about
what is worthy of being funded. The controversy over the funding of Robert Mapplethorpe
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Finally, Professor Sunstein's agenda suffers from unabashed
elitism. Sunstein concedes that his program of broadcast regula-
tion may disproportionately benefit better-educated members of
the public who are fed up with the low quality of mass broadcast
speech (pp 90-91). So what if the less-educated members of the
public don't want to view the highbrow material? It will be an
uplifting, educational experience. They might even learn to like
it. After all, mass taste is just a matter of socialized preference.
And, if the less educated turn off the set, that's OK, too. Perhaps
they watch too much TV anyway.
Even if Sunstein is correct in urging government subsidies
for highbrow entertainment, he cannot justify overriding the
preferences of average Americans as part of an exercise in state-
imposed self-improvement. If, as he claims, preferences are mere-
ly an artificial construct, Sunstein's highbrow preferences are
just as artificial as the preferences of the mass of Americans who,
according to him, don't know any better. In the end, his argu-
ment comes down to allowing Cass Sunstein's social class to use
the government to elevate its speech preferences over everyone
else's.
As a diagnosis of the failings of our free speech system, it's
hard to fault Sunstein's work. But his effort to generate an ideal
agenda for censorship that, at bottom, merely tracks his subjec-
tive values cannot, in my opinion, provide an enduring model for
thinking about free expression in a free society.
HI. SPEECH, CHANGE, AND EXISTING FIRST
AMENDMENT DOCTRINE
Assume, however, that Professor Sunstein could deal ade-
quately with the strategic criticisms. After all, as he points out,
the threat of government abuse under his system may be no
worse than the reality of existing private controls on speech un-
der the current system. And elitism is not all bad. Maybe we do
need an occasional collective rap on the knuckles by a national
social studies teacher. Finally, it is even possible that Professor
Sunstein's formidable intellect can pump life into his razor-thin
distinctions. Serious conceptual flaws would, nevertheless, under-
cut both the validity of, and the need for, a "New Deal" for
speech.
is a classic example of the problem. There is no reason to believe that the discussion will
become less political when the issue turns from subsidy to toleration.
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First, Professor Sunstein's entire effort is premised on his
assertion that the First Amendment's primary purpose is the
protection of deliberative democracy. Without this Madisonian
baseline, Sunstein's "New Deal" merely dilutes existing rules of
property law and trivializes individual preferences, leaving noth-
ing in their place.
Professor Sunstein argues that his "Madisonian" reading of
the First Amendment as a commitment to a community of politi-
cal equals is truer to the document's history. Without getting into
a debate about originalism, it is a real stretch to designate a
community of political equals as the ultimate value in a docu-
ment that studiously avoided mention of the idea of equality,
that tacitly endorsed slavery, that accepted a subordinate status
for women, that tolerated substantial property qualifications for
voting and holding office, and that carefully preserved real power
in the hands of a propertied elite through the indirect election of
the President and the Senate. 9
Moreover, even if the First Amendment is given an egalitari-
an Madisonian reading, the most one can say is that it is a read-
ing, not the reading. Even Professor Sunstein concedes that the
First Amendment protects more than deliberative democracy (pp
129-30). As Tom Emerson has suggested, respect for individual
autonomy is an integral part of any complete conception of the
First Amendment. ° While Professor Sunstein pays tribute to
noninstrumental values of personal autonomy, he often subordi-
nates autonomy to political equality when the two are in serious
tension (pp 153-54).
As with most academic grand theory, Professor Sunstein
needs a prime value to run his machine. He chooses political
equality. Others might choose personal autonomy. But the best
reading of the First Amendment chooses neither as a prime val-
ue. Rather, it seeks the untidy blend of both that is possible
under existing free speech doctrine.
Existing free speech doctrine is driven by at least five axi-
oms: (1) free speech is necessary if the marketplace of ideas is to
find truth; (2) free speech is necessary to assure the informed
choice that is the backbone of democracy; (3) free speech is neces-
"' See Thurgood Marshall, The Constitution's Bicentennial: Commemorating the
Wrong Document?, 40 Vand L Rev 1337 (1987).
' See T. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression 6-9 (Random House, 1970).
See also Baker, 61 U Chi L Rev at 1197-98 (cited in note 4). For a thoughtful analysis of
the role of autonomy in free speech theory, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Two Senses of
Autonomy, 46 Stan L Rev 875 (1994).
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sary to permit an avenue for peaceful change; (4) human beings
may not be trusted to act fairly as censors; and (5) respect for
self-expression is an integral aspect of respect for human dignity.
The first three axioms are avowedly instrumental, the fourth
is strategic, and the fifth is deontological. The resulting doctrine
is an untidy blend of concern for the dignitary interests of speak-
ers and the instrumental needs of listeners, with a decided tilt
toward the speaker unless the listener can demonstrate a power-
ful need for assistance.
While the three instrumental justifications provide important
protection for much speech, they also supply a built-in rationale
for censoring speech that appears to retard their goals. Thus,
were free speech doctrine to privilege instrumental justifications
and devalue strategic and deontological concerns, speech that
was said to obfuscate truth, impede choice, or frustrate change
would be fair game for censorship.
Conventional First Amendment doctrine does not, however,
stop with instrumentalism-whether Robert Bork's crude version
or Cass Sunstein's considerably more sophisticated variation.
Rather, the logical limits of instrumental justification are leav-
ened by: (1) intense suspicion of the government's ability to ad-
minister a censorship program fairly; and (2) an understanding
that self-expression is a fundamental aspect of human dignity,
whether or not the expression pays its way in instrumental
terms. When one asks why the Flat Earth Society (or the Nazis)
remain free to assert that Columbus was wrong (or that Jews are
inferior), the answer cannot plausibly be rooted solely in meta-
phors about searches for truth or the link between speech, choice,
and change. Rather, such patently unhelpful speech is protected
because we mistrust the capacity of government censors to identi-
fy, much less stop at, flat-earth speech; and, because we respect
an individual's attempt at self-expression as an end in itself,
whether or not it advances an instrumental agenda. Professor
Sunstein's effort to tether the First Amendment to his ideal of
deliberative democracy subordinates strategic and deonotological
considerations to his instrumental agenda with potentially dire
consequences for speech that a censor claims lies beyond the
Madisonian pale.
The second conceptual flaw in Professor Sunstein's program
is that he substantially overstates the extent to which legal rules
defining private property and shaping individual preferences are
subject to government rearrangement.
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Professor Sunstein repeatedly announces his respect for
private property and free markets. I believe him. But his model
occasionally implies that private property is almost wholly an
artificial construct subject to rearrangement at the will of the
majority, at least when it gets in the way of very important val-
ues like Madisonian democracy (pp 30-33). Such a contingent
view of property considerably overstates the impact of the New
Deal. While the existing property baseline is not written in stone,
neither is it written in sand. One need not embrace Lochner to
recognize that real limits exist on the majority's ability to rear-
range the property baseline, even in aid of important values.
Professor Sunstein's argument that the property of powerful
speakers can be regulated in certain circumstances to enhance
the speech of the weak may be correct, but he must do more than
cite the New Deal to make his point.
Rhetoric about disappearing property baselines lacks both a
principled beginning and a principled end. It is possible under
current First Amendment doctrine to establish the preconditions
to regulate overly powerful players in the speech process. But, as
the Supreme Court held in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v
FCC,5 the necessity for such regulation must be carefully docu-
mented, and the regulation itself must be appropriately narrow.
In contrast, one of the real risks inherent in Professor Sunstein's
model is that it encourages the political majority to disregard the
property baseline in the speech area without being required to
make the heightened showing of harm and necessity required
under existing doctrine.
Whatever one's view, however, of the effort to establish a
Madisonian vision of the First Amendment and the effort to es-
tablish government power to regulate the property interests of
powerful speakers, I find Professor Sunstein's treatment of indi-
vidual preferences and personality as an artificial baseline pro-
foundly troubling. It is one thing to argue that property is a
state-defined construct subject to manipulation in aid of
Madisonian values; it is another to treat an individual's personal-
ity as a construct partially shaped by legal rules, and, thus, sub-
ject to improvement at the hands of a benevolent state. A New
Deal for speech that invites the government to view an
individual's speech preferences and world view as a contingent
baseline awaiting improvement through censorship is indefensi-
ble.52
114 S Ct 2445, 2470-71 (1994).
52 While I do not believe that Professor Sunstein wishes to create such an Orwellian
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One of the criticisms of the liberal state is that it fails to
protect weak listeners from speech that reinforces their subordi-
nate status.5 3 Underlying that critique is a conception of the in-
dividual as a vulnerable, pliable vessel, with a fragile psyche that
can easily be warped by ugly, crude, or self-interested speech.
The alternative conception views the individual as a powerful
autonomous presence, capable of accepting or rejecting wide vari-
eties of speech, no matter how crude or ugly, as part of a rational
formation of individual preferences and world view.
As a matter of empiricism, reasonable people can differ over
which picture is more accurate. But as a matter of legal policy, I
do not believe that there is a choice when it comes to shaping
free speech rules. Unless free speech doctrine remains firmly
rooted in respect for the capacity of autonomous individuals to
make decisions about preferences, it will inevitably degenerate
into paternalistic manipulation.' When Professor Sunstein re-
jects broad censorship of hate speech and argues that speech
cannot be banned merely because it is offensive, he endorses
precisely such a view of the individual. But when he seeks to
permit just a little bit of paternalistic censorship by arguing that
racial epithets and violent pornography harm weak groups, he
reverts to a view of the individual that cannot be reconciled with
the rest of free speech doctrine.
Once again, as with the effort to regulate overly powerful
participants in the speech market, I do not believe that it is nec-
essary to deploy the heavy artillery of disappearing individual
baselines to achieve incremental reform. Classic free speech doc-
trine permits regulation in those areas where genuine showings
of harm can be made that are consistent with the strong view of
the individual that underlies our free institutions. Indeed, the
most powerful argument against Sunstein's call for a "New Deal"
for free speech is that it just isn't necessary.
Under existing doctrine, if a persuasive case can be made
that speech actually causes a serious harm to a listener, redress
is clearly possible. For example, as Professor Sunstein notes,
existing law does not protect blackmail, extortion, threats, or
system, I do not see how his construct can avoid it.
' See Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 Iowa L Rev 1405 (1986);
Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion,
Democratic Deliberation and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 Harv L Rev 601 (1990).
' See Fallon, 46 Stan L Rev 875 (cited in note 50). Fallon distinguishes between de-
scriptive autonomy, an empirical concept, and ascriptive autonomy, an idea verging on the
existential. I am employing the concept in its most ascriptive form.
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intimidation (p 11). The easy explanation for the failure to pro-
tect extortion is that neither a speaker's dignitary interest in
self-expression nor a listener's instrumental interest in maximiz-
ing choice are advanced by words designed to coerce a listener
into performing acts against her will. The difference between the
peaceful picketing in Vegelahn and extortion-or the coercive
picketing in Madsen v Women's Health Center55 -lies in the na-
ture of the "harm" inflicted on the listener. In Vegelahn, listeners
were free to accept or reject the message. With extortion, black-
mail, or intimidation, the listener has no choice. Existing doctrine
thus protects listeners against words that leave them no choice
but to act in accordance with the message. That is why the Su-
preme Court has had no difficulty upholding Title VII's ban on
egregious speech in the workplace that actually denies a listener
the equal opportunity to perform on the job.5"
But, as the Madsen Court's refusal to enjoin aggressive
proselytization makes clear, listeners do not suffer a harm suffi-
cient to trigger censorship merely because they are confronted
with unwelcome or disturbing messages. Existing doctrine cannot
be tortured into a general warrant to protect weak hearers
against epithets and other forms of bias-speech unless one as-
sumes that such speech acts on them the way extortion acts on a
victim-destroying their power to reject the message. Such an
assumption would be both inaccurate as a matter of fact and
untenable as a matter of law. In order to accept it, we would be
obliged to abandon the model of the autonomous, rational indi-
vidual that underlies much of our political and economic struc-
ture.
Ironically, therefore, Professor Sunstein's willingness to ac-
cept censorship of racial epithets and violent pornography to
assure that harm is not done to weak listeners parallels Profes-
sor Epstein's lame defense of Vegelahn57 as an exercise in pro-
phylaxis designed to avoid intimidation. Both assume that listen-
ers cannot perform as strong, autonomous moral agents. Both are
wrong.
The capacity of existing doctrine to respond effectively to
genuine proof of harm is illustrated as well by Professor
n 114 S Ct 2516 (1994) (partially affirming an injunction preventing anti-abortion
demonstrators from approaching within thirty-six feet of a clinic).
Harris v Forklift Systems, Inc., 114 S Ct 367, 372-73 (1993) (Ginsburg concurring);
City of Los Angeles Department of Water and Power v Manhart, 435 US 702, 707 n 13
(1978). See also Meritor Savings Bank v Vinson, 477 US 57, 63-69 (1986).
" See Epstein, 92 Yale L J at 1377-78 (cited in note 7).
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Sunstein's discussion of child pornography. As a general matter,
where the harm that is alleged to flow from speech is caused by
the process of speech generation-as opposed to speech transmis-
sion-existing doctrine permits a greater degree of regulation.58
For example, if a plausible fear existed that the process of mak-
ing television programs generated cancer-causing electromagnetic
waves, I assume that no one would object to the banning of tele-
vision. Since the process of generating child pornography imposes
a lasting harm on the children involved, a ban on the process can
be similarly justified, even though it is content specific. 9 More-
over, the child pornography model can be expanded to violent
pornography involving adults if the adult's participation is invol-
untary, or if tangible harm to the participants can be demon-
strated. But the involuntariness must be real and the harm must
be proven.
Thus, under existing doctrine, if speech (or an overly power-
ful speaker) reallr does inflict serious harm on other listeners or
other speakers, and if no less drastic means exist to deal with the
serious harm, the First Amendment does not stand in the way of
a remedy. Professor Sunstein's discussion of extortion and child
pornography illustrates precisely that point. So does the Court's
effort in Turner to forge rules governing cable television. But
Turner and the other applications of the harm principle require
real proof of harm rather than speculations about it. And proving
real harm involves more than positing a fragile psyche and as-
sembling anecdotal evidence of pain. At a minimum, as in extor-
tion, it means proving that speech disables the processes of ratio-
nal thought that participants in a free society use to determine
individual preference.
If we were confronted with inflexible First Amendment doc-
trine that made it impossible to confront serious problems beset-
ting society, perhaps Professor Sunstein's book would be a need-
ed call for change. But existing doctrine is flexible enough to deal
with harm when it can be demonstrated, not merely asserted.
Much of Sunstein's program involves casual, highly contestable
claims about harms caused by speech, often associated with a
view of the individual as a fragile vessel easily injured by speech
or in need of assistance in forming preferences. That leaves his
Blasi, 94 Colum L Rev at 1297-1302 (cited in note 4).
" See, for example, New York v Ferber, 458 US 747 (1982) (upholding a ban on child
pornography).
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book as a call to fix a doctrine that isn't broken by the imposition
of a cure that is worse than the disease.
CONCLUSION
My hope is that egalitarian reformers will stop trying to
make things better by managing speech. It is only a matter of
time until the left recharges its intellectual batteries and begins,
once again, to produce serious political ideas calculated to change
things for the better. When that happens, every inch of free
speech protection is going to be needed to shield those ideas from
censorship designed to block change. How sad it would be to have
those ideas frustrated because impatient intellectuals couldn't
wait.

